Over the period of its lifetime, housing is very cheap; but in practical terms this is only recognised through the power of investment. Old people, who are home owners, recognise this.
The 1972 HA abolished our low cost rented system, which was based on investment. It has been replaced by a high cost private rented consumer service, heavily subsidised by Housing Benefit payments, which now threatens to trap most new housholds within the ranks of the propertyless poor.
Does anyone actually think, that ending the credit crisis will bring relief to first time buyers? And if not by using investment, how can affordable housing be achieved for those unable to buy?
UK House Prices were very high and very unstable for many years before the credit crunch. These long-term problems were caused by the long-term developments of UK Housing Policy and they will not be solved by ending the credit crunch. It is true that prices have fallen due to the credit crunch, but they will rise as soon as the banks begin to lend again; so this analysis offers no comfort to young people aspiring to make new homes. The level and stability of house prices in Europe and the UK is critically related the availability of alternative accommodation in low cost rented housing. The high prices and instability of UK housing has been caused by the privatisation of the rented housing sector and a deliberate policy to eliminate investment in a low cost rented alternative. Putting the case very simply:
European countries have retained the very large resources of low cost rented housing, built in response to the great needs of the post war populations. Consequently house prices in Europe have remained much lower than in the UK and, especially in Germany and France, have been much more stable. Like council housing in the UK, the investment in low cost rented housing was cumulative; increasing in value, but falling in cost. It was sold off cheaply in the UK and replaced by private rented services at a cost to the taxpayer of £12 Billion pounds per year and rising.
In America, the profile of national wealth and the history of housing policy are entirely different to Europe. In the US, housing has been relatively cheap (low population density, large resources of building materials) and well within the range of significantly higher average incomes. Average American house prices have been 10% less than UK prices, in spite of the fact that the average house is twice as large as its UK counterpart, (so equivalent housing in America is 40% of its UK cost). The poverty sinks of the 2% public housing sector have significant problems, but they appear to raises little electoral concern. Until the current banking failures, American house prices had been very stable for more than forty years.
The life defining risk in the decision to buy is the long-term result of UK housing policy. It will not be resolved by the ending of the current economic banking crisis. More pertinently, the UK government will face a new housing crisis. The imperative to increase the instruments of banking regulation would logically limit mortgage loans to the historically prudent level of 2.5 x Income, but this will threaten the current structures of housing policy with total collapse. Having been careless in the past, I am going to date this prediction (16 September 2009).
It is an interesting dilemma for UK economists. The cause of the credit crunch has been clearly identified. It was due to excessive lending in the American sub prime market (mainly in the US housing market) and regulation will be introduced to prevent it happening in the future. Quite right too!
But the financial structures of UK housing policy, over the last 35 years, have developed a widespread dependence on high-risk loans. How are we going to escape from that? With great difficulty Yes! But impossible until we acknowledge the vital importance of a low cost rented housing sector.
There is no easy solution. The greed that brought an economic and banking crisis to the world has been acknowledged and its effects have mortgaged our children into debt. But the 35 year long UK housing recession has not been acknowledged. It was a mistake to abolish the low cost rented sector in 1971. It was and is a mistake to fritter away huge national investment by the discounted sales of council houses since 1980. It was a mistake to replace it with a high cost private rented consumer service.
Sanity in banking demands that loans of 5 times income are totally unacceptable. But in UK housing, young people, even on well above national average incomes, have taken such risk and more because the UK market offers no alternative. How can economists fail to acknowledge these circumstances? A sensible banking decision to limit loans to the historically prudent level of 2.5 times income, will more than decimate the UK housing market. The measures to solve the world banking crisis conflict with the current financial structures of UK housing policy. This new unconsidered crisis looms and mayhem will decsend on the government that flinches from its solution.
The following pages will develop the vision of a Complementary Housing Policy. They will explain the complementary relationships and interactions between home ownership and rented accommodation. They will show the financial structures that are necessary to allow these complementary relationships to flourish and to provide the powerful stabilisation of house prices. They will show the potential to end long-term housing benefit subsidies, which would result in public savings of tens of billions of pounds/year.
In the years following World War II, both Labour and Conservative governments competed, to provide low cost rented housing and fulfil the popular demand to build 'Homes fit for Heroes'.
In 1945 Nye Bevin chose to use the instruments of local government to build houses, which became known as council houses. They were houses of the highest quality that raised the standards for all other housing.
Most other governments in war damaged Europe created large stocks of low cost rented housing, but they employed a much wider variety of agencies (churches, charities, trade unions and local government) to carry out the task. They remain as a very large and important alternative to home ownership in Western Europe.
Unlike anything in Europe, a huge change took place in the UK housing market in 1971.
Economic experts in the UK have not acknowledged, dismissed, or even investigated the cause and effect relationship between the doubling of council rent announcement and the first great peak of UK housing inflation.
In the post-war period, until 1971, UK house prices fluctuated within the 10% price inflation band and they followed the trends of general inflation very closely.
Since 1971, unlike most other countries, UK house prices have been wildly and persistently unstable. Fluctuating in the 50% inflation band, they have clearly led the trends of general inflation for nearly 40 years.
The issues that merit discussion in this period of persistent instability are many; but throughout the period, new policy has consolidated the financial structures, which have abolished the previously low cost rented sector and have attempted to encouraged its replacement by the private rented sector.
Because the UK buyers risk is always high, the market responds hypersensitively to the slightest changes. It is because there is no cheaper alternative to the perceived ideal of home ownership that the UK House Price Market has remained wildly and persistently unstable since 1971.
Whether Buying or Renting, Affordability is a major problem of the UK housing market.
Housing poverty has become the defining measure of disadvantage. Low-income families are forced in to dependency on housing benefit. This trap ensures their rising cost of accommodation as a consumer service, compared with the buyers diminishing investment costs. It restricts their choice of housing placement to the increasingly stigmatised area of social housing. Residualisation is associated with the wider processes of social exclusion. Unemployment, special needs, the least desirable dwellings and areas, poorly served by other services, makes these households less able to build satisfactory homes or to avail themselves of opportunities, which could increase their income and bargaining power and enable them to move on.
Labour party debate is focused on the logistical strategies of stock transfers for remaining council houses, while working within the constraints of rent and disinvestment policies, which have radically changed the structures of housing provision over the last 40 years. But, logistics should not be confused with policy. In particular, the uneven application of the Right to Buy must not be solved by extending it across all social housing because that would make the reform of housing policy more difficult. The Right to Buy is a key policy of disinvestment thought necessary to revive the private rented sector, but growth has failed to replace the disinvestment. The deep problems of housing provision, the property-less poor and the stability of the housing market are laid at the door of current policy and the loss of the low cost rented sector.>>>
In 1971 the post war policy of investment in a low cost rented sector was radically reformed by new financial structures, which transformed the rented sector into a rented consumer service.
This section explains the financial basis of council housing and its use of investment to yield low cost-balanced rents. A model is used to illustrate the principle with evidence that the record of performance did match the model. Rents of the rented consumer service now equal the first year cost of a mortgage. The policy has failed to provide an alternative for affordable housing and has resulted in a huge rise in the level of risk that first time buyers are willing to take. >>>
Housing Benefit supported high rents and the discounted sale of rented stocks is a policy of tenure, which has failed to provide affordable housing in spite of its huge and rising cost to the taxpayer. Instead, it has created a poverty trap for the property-less poor and conditions of risk for first-time buyers, which has made the house price market unstable. The evidence for the advantages of using investment to provide a rented stock, rather than a consumer service is stunning. A Complementary Housing policy exploits the different timing of investment structures with a policy of open access to bring these advantages to everyone, with the further advantage of stabilising the housing market and eventually removing the burden of subsidies.>>>
The graph shows the public cost of subsidies for two models of housing provision for low income households.
a) A none profit investment stock.
b) A modest profit rented consumer service.
Both models are calculated for two cases of tenant income:
1. National Average Wage (NAW)
2. Half the National Average Wage (HNAW)
The actual rent of model a) is 30% of income, but the actual rent of model b) is 30% of income plus the Housing Benefit subsidy.
The record shows that many councils achieved 'model a' surplus after only 27yrs; sufficient to support significant building programmes, without further subsidy. (see: Colchester.)